# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC---Disclosure

#### Undisclosed new plans and cards are bad –

#### Vote neg for education and fairness---preparation enables effective research, clash and depth–new Affs force zero-sum choices between flowing and reading the 1AC or using lots of prep at the expense of the 2NR

#### Disclosing the aff when we ask after the pairing rewards new research while allowing some neg prep.

#### Magnified by vagueness in the 2AC – don’t let them have new 2AC clarification of solvency deficits.

#### That makes debate impossible and turns the case---vote neg for fairness.

Lange, 20 – Perry, along with Leon B. Greenfield and Nicole Callan, all Members of the District of Columbia Bar. “Antitrust Populism and the Consumer Welfare Standard: What are we Actually Debating?” ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 83, <https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/files/shared_content/editorial/publications/documents/20201230-antitrust-law-journal_antitrust-populism-and-the-consumer-welfare-standard-what-are-we-actually-debating.pdf> -- Iowa

Populism has the potential to play a constructive role in shaping the development of antitrust, as other movements (such as the Chicago School) have done. But populism can realize that potential only if the antitrust community properly construes and substantively engages with populist criticisms.119 The antitrust community must rigorously evaluate populist proposals for concreteness and workability and examine their real-world consequences (both intended and unintended).

### 1NC---DOJ DA---Democracy \*0:56\*

#### The DOJ is battling gerrymandering but it’s time and resource intensive

Beitsch, 9-1-2021, Rebecca, "DOJ issues warning to states ahead of redistricting," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/570385-doj-issues-warning-to-states-ahead-of-redistricting> -- Iowa

The Department of Justice (DOJ) on Wednesday issued a warning to states ahead of a year of congressional mapmaking that it will pursue cases against jurisdictions that seek to dilute the voting power of various minorities.

The latest guidance from the DOJ signals an administration prepared to take a more aggressive approach in battling gerrymandering.

“We're hopeful that this guidance will give jurisdictions the ability to understand their obligations so that they comply with those obligations without any need for additional enforcement by the Department of Justice,” a senior administration official said on a call with reporters.

“But where jurisdictions don't draw maps that fairly enable all citizens, regardless of race or membership in a language minority, to elect the candidates of their choice — the Justice Department will act,” the official said.

The guidance comes as the Census Bureau has completed its decennial population survey, sharing the data states and local governments will use to draw new political boundaries, including congressional and state legislative districts.

This year will be the first round of redistricting since the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Shelby v. Holder, which gutted Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that gave the DOJ the right to pre-clear maps in states with a history of racial discrimination.

But the department on Wednesday said it would be ready to go after any jurisdiction that doesn’t meet the “one person, one vote” principle.

The guidance sent to government officials Wednesday breaks down the type of cases the department can bring under Section 2 of the law, which prohibits voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color or membership in a language minority group.

That includes any redistricting plan that “minimizes or cancels out the voting strength” of various groups — something often achieved by fracturing a minority group across districts or packing them into one district — as well as whether a jurisdiction has a “history of official discrimination.”

The guidance also takes aim at any states that may seek to redistrict based on the number of U.S. citizens in its boundaries, saying the DOJ “will consider whether any efforts to change the apportionment base for a districting plan to a measure other than total population.”

Doing so would diminish the representation of places with a large migrant population and follows a failed effort by the prior Trump administration to include a question on the census that would ask a resident's citizenship status.

Despite the hope from the DOJ that the guidance will help avoid lawsuits, many redistricting maps often spend years in litigation, with lawsuits at times stretching into the next reapportionment cycle.

The official also noted Wednesday that much of the litigation could be spurred by outside groups — including those that may use the 2020 data to challenge existing maps.

The notice to state and local governments also follows a year in which state governments enacted a number of laws that could restrict access to the ballot.

According to a July analysis from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 18 states have already enacted 30 laws this year that will make it harder for Americans to vote.

Wednesday’s guidance is the third voting-related guidance released by the Biden administration.

In July, the department issued instructions on post-election audits and a flurry of voting laws passed after the 2020 elections, warning states some of their actions may run afoul of the law.

#### Antitrust decks DOJ resources and time

Mcgill and Overly, 19 – Margaret Harding Mcgill and Steven Overly, "Why breaking up Facebook won't be easy," May 27, *POLITICO*, <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/27/breaking-up-facebook-antittrust-1446087> -- Iowa

3) Antitrust cases take time and money

The Justice Department’s antitrust lawsuit against AT&T, and its unsuccessful battle to break up Microsoft, were years-long affairs that started under one presidential administration and ended in another. That means whoever wins the White House in 2020 could well be out of office before a potential case against Facebook is decided or settled.

The AT&T case began in 1974 and ended in 1982, after which the government spent another two years implementing an agreement that split up the company into eight smaller entities.

The government spent another decade in the 1990s and early 2000s waging an antitrust war against Microsoft for anti-competitive behavior, arguing that its operating system and internet browser should be separated. But by the time the court approved a settlement in 2002, requiring changes to the company's business practices but leaving Microsoft intact, the penalties did not have much impact, Verveer said.

“Technology will change, business models will change, consumer preferences will change,” he said. “You could end up at the end of a long process with something that frankly doesn't make very much difference because the world has moved on.”

That's one reason some Facebook critics, including former DOJ antitrust official Gene Kimmelman, argue that imposing restrictions on how social media companies use data could be a more effective strategy than breaking them up.

A lengthy lawsuit against Facebook would also consume a lot of resources at the DOJ, which might have to hire outside attorneys and other experts as it did in the Microsoft case. The expense could even require additional appropriations from Congress, Schwartzman said.

“It is a really daunting enterprise,” Schwartzman said. “The likelihood the Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission would be able to undertake such an activity is remote.”

#### Redistricting shatters democracy in irreversible ways minus DOJ intervention

Mansbridge et al, 21 – Jane Mansbridge is Professor Emerita of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at Harvard University writing with over 100+ scholars of democracy. “Statement of Concern: The Threats to American Democracy and the Need for National Voting and Election Administration Standards,” <https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/statements/statement-of-concern/> -- Iowa

We, the undersigned, are scholars of democracy who have watched the recent deterioration of U.S. elections and liberal democracy with growing alarm. Specifically, we have watched with deep concern as Republican-led state legislatures across the country have in recent months proposed or implemented what we consider radical changes to core electoral procedures in response to unproven and intentionally destructive allegations of a stolen election. Collectively, these initiatives are transforming several states into political systems that no longer meet the minimum conditions for free and fair elections. Hence, our entire democracy is now at risk.

When democracy breaks down, it typically takes many years, often decades, to reverse the downward spiral. In the process, violence and corruption typically flourish, and talent and wealth flee to more stable countries, undermining national prosperity. It is not just our venerated institutions and norms that are at risk—it is our future national standing, strength, and ability to compete globally.

Statutory changes in large key electoral battleground states are dangerously politicizing the process of electoral administration, with Republican-controlled legislatures giving themselves the power to override electoral outcomes on unproven allegations should Democrats win more votes. They are seeking to restrict access to the ballot, the most basic principle underlying the right of all adult American citizens to participate in our democracy. They are also putting in place criminal sentences and fines meant to intimidate and scare away poll workers and nonpartisan administrators. State legislatures have advanced initiatives that curtail voting methods now preferred by Democratic-leaning constituencies, such as early voting and mail voting. Republican lawmakers have openly talked about ensuring the “purity” and “quality” of the vote, echoing arguments widely used across the Jim Crow South as reasons for restricting the Black vote.

State legislators supporting these changes have cited the urgency of “electoral integrity” and the need to ensure that elections are secure and free of fraud. But by multiple expert judgments, the 2020 election was extremely secure and free of fraud. The reason that Republican voters have concerns is because many Republican officials, led by former President Donald Trump, have manufactured false claims of fraud, claims that have been repeatedly rejected by courts of law, and which Trump’s own lawyers have acknowledged were mere speculation when they testified about them before judges.

In future elections, these laws politicizing the administration and certification of elections could enable some state legislatures or partisan election officials to do what they failed to do in 2020: reverse the outcome of a free and fair election. Further, these laws could entrench extended minority rule, violating the basic and longstanding democratic principle that parties that get the most votes should win elections.

Democracy rests on certain elemental institutional and normative conditions. Elections must be neutrally and fairly administered. They must be free of manipulation. Every citizen who is qualified must have an equal right to vote, unhindered by obstruction. And when they lose elections, political parties and their candidates and supporters must be willing to accept defeat and acknowledge the legitimacy of the outcome. The refusal of prominent Republicans to accept the outcome of the 2020 election, and the anti-democratic laws adopted (or approaching adoption) in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Montana and Texas—and under serious consideration in other Republican-controlled states—violate these principles. More profoundly, these actions call into question whether the United States will remain a democracy. As scholars of democracy, we condemn these actions in the strongest possible terms as a betrayal of our precious democratic heritage.

The most effective remedy for these anti-democratic laws at the state level is federal action to protect equal access of all citizens to the ballot and to guarantee free and fair elections. Just as it ultimately took federal voting rights law to put an end to state-led voter suppression laws throughout the South, so federal law must once again ensure that American citizens’ voting rights do not depend on which party or faction happens to be dominant in their state legislature, and that votes are cast and counted equally, regardless of the state or jurisdiction in which a citizen happens to live. This is widely recognized as a fundamental principle of electoral integrity in democracies around the world.

A new voting rights law (such as that proposed in the John Lewis Voting Rights Act) is essential but alone is not enough. True electoral integrity demands a comprehensive set of national standards that ensure the sanctity and independence of election administration, guarantee that all voters can freely exercise their right to vote, prevent partisan gerrymandering from giving dominant parties in the states an unfair advantage in the process of drawing congressional districts, and regulate ethics and money in politics

It is always far better for major democracy reforms to be bipartisan, to give change the broadest possible legitimacy. However, in the current hyper-polarized political context such broad bipartisan support is sadly lacking. Elected Republican leaders have had numerous opportunities to repudiate Trump and his “Stop the Steal” crusade, which led to the violent attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Each time, they have sidestepped the truth and enabled the lie to spread.

We urge members of Congress to do whatever is necessary—including suspending the filibuster—in order to pass national voting and election administration standards that both guarantee the vote to all Americans equally, and prevent state legislatures from manipulating the rules in order to manufacture the result they want. Our democracy is fundamentally at stake. History will judge what we do at this moment.

#### Democratic peace halts great power war

Imai and Lo, 21 – Kosuke Imai is Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University. James Lo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California. “Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis,” *International Organization* 75, Summer 2021, pp. 901–19, doi:10.1017/S0020818321000126 – Iowa

The proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other is one of the most enduring and influential ideas in international relations. The idea is theoretically rooted in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that interactions between states with a republican form of government give “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.”1 This has led to a large literature empirically documenting a negative association between democracy and conflict,2 leading one scholar to comment that the democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”3

Despite the law-like nature of this association, no scholarly consensus has emerged on whether the observed association reflects a causal relationship or a spurious correlation. According to a recent survey, more than 30 percent of international relations scholars disagree with the democratic peace theory.4 In particular, skeptics have challenged the democratic peace by arguing that alliance structures from the Cold War,5 capitalism,6 and contract-intensive economies7 confound the observed association. These authors find that adding certain confounding variables to regression models eliminates the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for the joint democracy variable.8

How should we resolve this empirical debate regarding the democratic peace?9 Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never completely rule out the possible existence of confounding biases that arise from omitted variables. While scholars in this literature have exclusively relied on parametric regression models, this approach requires strong assumptions, namely that the model accurately characterizes the true data-generating process (correct set of variables, right functional form, valid distributional assumption, etc.). Given that these assumptions may not be verifiable from observed data, it is no surprise that various scholars advocate different regression models with diverging sets of variables, resulting in contradictory findings. The difficulty of adjudicating between these alternative modeling approaches has led to the ongoing controversy in the empirical democratic peace literature.

We propose an alternative approach based on nonparametric sensitivity analysis to formally assess the robustness of the empirical evidence.10 Specifically, we quantify the strength of confounding relationships that could explain away the observed association between democracy and peace. That is, we compute the precise level of unobserved confounding needed to render the observed association between democracy and conflict spurious. The idea is that although not all correlations imply causation, a very strong correlation suggests it. Unlike the parametric regression modeling approach prevalent in the literature, the proposed nonparametric sensitivity approach directly addresses the existence of unobserved confounders without assuming a particular regression model.11 Although one can never know with certainty from observational data whether democracy causes peace, this nonparametric sensitivity analysis can formally assess the robustness of empirical evidence for the democratic peace.

Our analysis applies the nonparametric sensitivity analysis method originally developed by Cornfield and colleagues, who were concerned with the robustness of the positive association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer in the potential presence of unobserved confounders.12 The study of the causal relationship between smoking and lung cancer closely parallels the dispute on the democratic peace. In both cases, randomized experiments cannot be conducted for ethical and logistical reasons, and critics contend that the observed association suffers from confounding biases. While no definitive conclusion can be drawn from observational data, Cornfield and colleagues argue that no existing confounder can explain the strong association between smoking and cancer and therefore this relationship is likely to be causal. Their conclusion is worth quoting here:

Cigarette smokers have a ninefold greater risk of developing lung cancer than nonsmokers, while over-two-pack-a-day smokers have at least a 60-fold greater risk. Any characteristic proposed as a measure of the postulated cause common to both smoking status and lung-cancer risk must therefore be at least nine-fold more prevalent among cigarette smokers than among nonsmokers and at least 60-fold more prevalent among two-pack-a-day smokers. No such characteristic has yet been produced despite diligent search.13

Our application of nonparametric sensitivity analysis to the democratic peace yields striking results. Depending on the definition of democracy, we find that a confounder must be at least forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other types of dyads. Thus, any potential confounder that could explain the democratic peace would have to be at least five times as prevalent as a similar confounder for smoking and lung cancer. In other words, according to our analysis, the positive association between democracy and peace is much more robust than that between smoking and lung cancer.

While no such confounder has yet been found for the relationship between smoking and lung cancer, we examine whether the confounders identified in the democratic peace literature meet the conditions of nonparametric sensitivity analysis. For example, we consider a set of economic confounders proposed by Gartzke who argues that the democratic peace can be explained by capitalism.14 We also consider other confounders, such as military alliances.15 Overall, our findings imply that for a potential confounder to explain away the democratic peace, it must be much more strongly associated with regime types and conflicts than the confounders that have been proposed to date. This finding again demonstrates the robustness of empirical evidence for the democratic peace.

### Indigenous Regimes Adv CP

#### CP: The United States federal government should

#### reduce extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws

#### Deny standing to foreign antitrust litigants from developing nations

#### Subsidize development and provide counseling to antitrust regimes in foreign nations

#### Murray is about how foreign private litigants suing through the U.S. prevents development---the CP solves by denying standing.

Murray ’17 [Sean; 2017; J.D. from Fordham University, B.A. from Vassar College; Fordham International Law Journal, “With a Little Help from my Friends: How a US Judicial International Comity Balancing Test Can Foster Global Antitrust Redress,” vol. 41]

With nowhere else to go, private litigants have naturally flocked to the United States for remedial assistance, creating an issue for developing antitrust regimes.12 Several implications attend foreign plaintiffs seeking recovery in the United States. American courts have recognized the importance of allowing foreign plaintiffs to bring claims in the United States under the Sherman Act.13 Before 2004, there was a significant chance that parties injured abroad by global cartels that directly harmed the United States would be able to sue in US courts to recover their losses.14 But, as illustrated above, private litigants applying US antitrust law for redressing harm that occurred abroad create tensions over sovereignty with other countries.15

Moreover, bringing claims to the United States strips valuable opportunities for young foreign antitrust regimes to develop their own jurisprudence, depressing the effectiveness of global antitrust enforcement and stalling the emergence of private redress.16 Worldwide jurisdictions are increasingly recognizing the importance of private rights of action to enforcement efforts.17 Within the past ten years several countries have expanded private parties’ ability to recover harm from unlawful anticompetitive behavior by allowing collective action.18 However, private actions remain rare in many developing antitrust jurisdictions with little, if any, precedent establishing the basis for compensatory damages or discovery.19

In response to international criticism of the statute’s unbridled transnational application, the United States has curtailed the Sherman Act’s reach both judicially and legislatively.20 Judicially, courts looked to international comity, the practice of taking into account the interests of other nations.21 The Ninth Circuit was the first court to invoke international comity in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., which used an interest-balancing test to determine whether exercising jurisdiction was proper.22 Legislatively, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”), which attempts to delimit and define the cross-border reach of US antitrust laws by introducing an objective test under the effects doctrine.23 Powerful arguments can be advanced in the American interest for applying US antitrust laws beyond US borders, including adequately protecting American competition and consumers, deterring inimical foreign anticompetitive behavior affecting the United States, especially in an increasingly globalized economy, and providing remedial measures to US victims of such conduct.24 However, these interests in providing protection and redress are counterbalanced by equally important rationales for limiting the extraterritorial span of US antitrust law, such as costly overregulation, avoiding international disputes, allowing nascent worldwide antitrust regimes to develop to beget increased antitrust enforcement, and avoiding harmful interference with antitrust regulators’ amnesty programs.25

The aforementioned responses to these competing concerns have been ambiguous, inconsistent, and over-inclusive or under-inclusive.26 In particular, the poorly worded FTAIA has created more problems than it has solved, including inconsistent holdings, wrongly decided cases, and disagreements among the circuit courts over interpreting the statute’s language.27 The most recent interpretational difficulty involves determining what constitutes a “direct” domestic effect under the FTAIA. Some courts have held that “direct” takes on a broader meaning, where conduct causing domestic effect need only be an “immediate consequence.”28 In comparison, other courts have narrowly interpreted the statute’s “direct” domestic effect requirement as calling for “a reasonably proximate causal nexus,” drawing from tort law to exclude an injury that is too remote from the injury’s cause.29 The most recent appellate decision involving the FTAIA, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., has contributed to the statute’s confusion.30 There, the Seventh Circuit held that a US parent company failed to show that it suffered direct injury as a result of foreign anticompetitive conduct, despite the fact that price-fixed component products were purchased by its majority-owned foreign subsidiaries to be incorporated into final products purchased by the US parent and sold to US customers.31

Nevertheless, various delineations already exist that suggest a solution to the inconsistency is attainable and may be designed to enhance global antitrust enforcement through greater availability of worldwide private redress. What is apparent from the succession of decisions from Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California32 to F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran)33 is that the FTAIA grey area has been sufficiently tapered to allow for the return of a comity balancing test to appropriately reconcile the conflicting interests at hand in the residual universe of cases.34 This Note argues that Hartford Fire, its progeny, and Empagran form confining parameters on the applicability of the FTAIA, namely that cases that do not involve a US party, domestic effect, and domestic injury arising from that effect will fail the FTAIA’s exemption test. Moreover, because the FTAIA’s “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect test can be construed as a proxy for the United States’ prescriptive jurisdiction interest, comity analysis is helpful in its interpretation.35 Thus, claims which are based on exclusively non-US conduct that questionably has a “direct effect” on US commerce resulting in the plaintiff’s injury are more properly decided not by the courts’ current focus on statutory interpretation, but rather by a Timberlane-style ad hoc fact-intensive balancing test that contemplates factors more suitable to the modern global economy and promoting international dialogue.36

In sum, this Note proposes the introduction of a new international comity balancing test into US antitrust jurisprudence with the aim of fostering and strengthening global antitrust enforcement and private redress. It does so in four parts. Following this introduction, Part II briefly summarizes the expansion of US antitrust extraterritorial application. Next, Part III discusses various developments undertaken to limit and demarcate the reach of US antitrust law. Part IV raises issues arising from those efforts that have resulted in inconsistent and questionable holdings. Finally in Part V, by analyzing and synthesizing the existing precedent, this Note contends that a judicial international comity balancing test would most appropriately determine the propriety of US antitrust extraterritoriality for particular types of private recompense cases that are problematic under the current framework.

### 1NC – K \*2:00\*

#### Capitalism is terminally unsustainable, it’s the root cause of every impact, and attempting to save it only results in extinction and scapegoating violence.

**Robinson 16** (William; 2016; professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara; Truthout; “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis”; <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)

In these mean streets of **globalized capitalism in crisis**, it has become profitable to **turn poverty** and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. **Escalating inequalities** fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a **stagnant global economy**, elites have managed to turn **war**, **structural violence** and **inequality** into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a **source of aesthetic pleasure**, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached **explosive dimensions**. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is **fast becoming systemic**. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a **descent into chaos** and uncertainty. 1) The level of **global** social polarization and **inequality is unprecedented** in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just **62 billionaires** -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the **top 1% owns more wealth** than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some **95 percent of the world's wealth**, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with **just 5 percent**. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the **new global social** **apartheid**. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the **downward mobility**, "precariatization," destabilization and **expulsion of majorities**. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class **cannot find productive outlets** to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to **stagnation in the world economy**. The signs ofan **impending depression** are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, **co-opting** some **into a hegemonic bloc** and **repressing the rest**. Alongside the spread of frightening **new systems of social control** and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that **depoliticize through consumerist fantasies** and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the **manipulation of fear** and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward **scapegoated communities**. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the **structural destabilization** of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism **hinges on** such manipulation of **social anxiety** at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality **requires extreme violence** and repression that lend to projects of **21st century fascism**. 2) The system is **fast reaching** the **ecological limits** to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as **nine** crucial "**planetary boundaries**." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- **climate change**, the **nitrogen cycle** and **diversity loss**. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and **fundamentally altering the earth** system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have **transformed** up to half of **the world's surface**. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that **undermines the conditions for life**. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "**No** other **creature has ever managed this** ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to **determine the course of life** long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated **commodification of nature**, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "**Green capitalism" appears** as **an oxymoron**, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the **concentrated control over** the means of global communications and **the production** and circulation **of knowledge**, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the **panoptical surveillance society** and the **age of thought control**. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be **force obedience** even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where **elites are insulated** through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through **gentrification**, **gated communities**, surveillance systems, and state and **private violence**. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of **privatized social services**, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are **accessible only by helicopter** and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals **rows of mansions** that appear as military compounds, **with** **private armed towers** and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could **live out their** aspirations and **fantasies**. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an **express lane reserved for** those that can pay **an exorbitant toll**. On this lane, the privileged **speed by**, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is **instantly recorded by** this **surveillance** system and a **heavy fine is imposed** on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, **warfare** and **police containment** have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even **glamorizing war and violence** as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are **prison industrial complexes**, **immigrant** and refugee **repression** and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and **capitalist schooling**. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to **colonize the mind** -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through **militarism**, extreme **masculinization**, racism and **racist mobilizations** against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and **faces collapse**. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are **no longer** any **new territories** to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. **What is there left to commodify?** Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a **turn toward militarized accumulation** -- **making wars** of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to **generate new opportunities** for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "**planet of slums**," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has **no** direct **use for surplus humanity**. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of **21st century slavery** possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "**precariatization**." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a **rising** reserve **army of immigrant labor**. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is **how to** **contain the real** and potential **rebellion** of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the **battlegrounds between mass resistance** movements **and** the new systems of **mass repression**. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of **genocide**, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do **not wield enough power** and authority **to** organize and **stabilize the system**, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were **unable to impose transnational regulation** on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has **broken free from** the **constraints** imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the **anarchy of the system** in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from **radical challenges from below**. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is **not enough**. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and **transformation toward a system** in which social need trumps private profit. A **global rebellion** against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is **popular**, **grassroots** and leftist **struggle**, and the rise of **new cultures of resistance**: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must **strive to influence**, from this vantage point, **the discourse and practice of movements** for a more just distribution of wealth and power. **Our survival** may depend on it.

#### Antitrust regulation greases the wheels of capitalism---the alternative is orienting ourselves towards worker control of the means of production.

James 4-10-21 (Leroy James, writer for Socialist Revolution, 4-10-2021, "Trusts and the Bipartisan Rise of US Imperialism," Socialist Revolution, https://socialistrevolution.org/trusts-and-us-imperialism/)

The power of the large tech monopolies has led to the return of a long-dormant American institution: antitrust enforcement. The consensus of the bourgeois press is that the period of unchecked tech mergers and acquisitions is now over. Large sections of both parties of the US capitalist class, the Democrats and the Republicans, now demand regulation or a break-up of the tech sector behemoths.

This change in direction started during the Trump administration, with the CEOs of Facebook, Amazon, and Apple [all questioned](https://www.ft.com/content/943cb0f6-3495-4eb0-a1b8-e66ecc68215c) at a Congressional hearing last July. This resulted in a House Committee report in January of this year concluding that these firms gained a monopoly position by engaging in behaviors—including acquisitions—that now require correction. Any such modifications will occur under President Biden, whose [staffing choices](https://www.wired.com/story/lina-khan-ftc-antitrust-biden-administration/) would appear to signal his intent to regulate the tech industry monopolies. Far from reflecting the whims of any particular politician, the shift to an antitrust stance flows from the interests of the capitalist class as a whole in the aftermath of a decade of unchecked monopoly expansion in tech after the 2008 crisis.

The shift of the ruling class toward the regulation of tech monopolies is not limited to the borders of the United States. In China, the capitalist state has also shifted its position on the technology giants, notably reigning in Alibaba head [Jack Ma](https://socialistrevolution.org/jack-ma-cowed-but-instability-still-looms-over-china/)and initiating a new wave of antitrust efforts. However, as such litigation does not meaningfully impinge on monopoly capital’s economic basis—private property—bourgeois antitrust action cannot solve the workers’ fundamental problems.

China has initiated a new wave of antitrust efforts, which has been seen in the reigning in Alibaba head Jack Ma. / Image: World Trade Organization via Flickr

“Antitrust” law refers to the area of law that attempts to define and regulate monopolistic business practices whereby companies act to limit competition. The word “trust” refers to a large company or collection of related companies that gain a monopoly position that allows them to set prices without being influenced by competitors in the market. Concretely, antitrust actions may block certain [mergers](https://www.axios.com/trump-administration-mergers-acquisitions-blocked-3d81f56f-6acf-4ef4-ab83-0405a418dc98.html) and acquisitions, break large monopolies up into smaller companies, or otherwise modify their behavior somehow.

The rise of capitalist monopolies, and the pronounced effect they had on the country’s social life, played a major role in US politics in the early 20th century. This was a period of transition in the way capitalism operated in the country, and the government responded with periods of antitrust litigation followed by periods of deregulation. While the purpose of antitrust litigation was ostensibly to reverse the process of monopolization—with appeals for a return to an idealized epoch of “competitive capitalism”—it was, in reality, an attempt to facilitate this process while minimizing the organized action of the working class in the class struggle. The development of monopoly capitalism molded the US political system into something resembling its current form, in which both major parties serve to defend and further the fundamental interests of the capitalists.

Lenin analyzed this phenomenon in his work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. He described the emergence of monopolies, the eventual dominance of finance capital, corresponding to a division of world markets among the most economically developed nations. This transformation, which had reached maturity in advanced capitalist countries like the US by the end of World War I, required ever greater state intervention in critical sectors of the economy while remaining entirely capitalist.

In a distorted way, this evolution of capitalism points to the potential for socialism. Solving the world’s problems on a working-class basis will require the massive harnessing of the productive forces, coordinated by a democratically run centralized state apparatus. But this potential can only be unlocked by overthrowing capitalism and replacing the capitalists with workers as the ruling class in society.

Lenin analyzed the domination of finance capital and monopolies in his work Imperialism. / Image: George Grantham Bain Collection of the Library of Congress

The rise of the trusts

For the contending classes in US society, the Civil War of the 1860s triggered a fundamental shift. The abolition of slavery did away with the core contradiction between the Northern and Southern ruling classes and their respective political parties, and the decades after the war saw a sharp escalation in the class struggle.

The war “cleared the decks” for the unfettered spread of capitalism across the continent. And although large parts of the South languished in relative backwardness, the postwar years saw the completion of a nationwide logistics network.

The first transcontinental rail line was completed in 1869, and the industrialization of this throughway required a new level of productive output. To meet the financial and technological needs at scale, trusts formed around the railroad network, with a tremendous vertical and horizontal concentration of capital. The emergence of this new type of company flowed from the logic of capitalist production itself. In short, a specific quantity of human labor-power, expended in a massively coordinated way, can generate more wealth than the same quantity of labor-power expended in a more atomized way by several smaller enterprises.

The earliest trusts included those controlled by several prominent capitalists, including Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, JP Morgan, and Andrew Mellon, who concentrated production in a range of industries, both vertically and horizontally, often employing the tools of high finance. The resulting process of concentration led to new levels of productivity, funneling colossal profits—and influence over the state—into the hands of a few capitalists.

The earliest trusts like those controlled by JP Morgan, concentrated production in a range of industries, both vertically and horizontally, often employing the tools of high finance. / Image: Bain News Service via Picryl

Capitalist parties forced to break up certain monopolies

As they came to dominate many aspects of society, monopolies became organically unpopular across the country. The common-sense understanding among workers, as well as many capitalists, was that monopolism was harmful. The solution demanded in the popular consciousness was to break up the trusts—to “bust” them. Workers and petty capitalists believed they shared a common interest in confronting the big capitalists who controlled the largest trusts, and broad support for trust-busting led both major parties to support occasional action to break up large monopoly firms.

In this context, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 made it a crime to “try to restrain trade or form a monopoly,” passed with bipartisan support. The law was drafted by Republican John Sherman, the brother of Civil War general William Tecumseh Sherman—the abolition of slavery and modern antitrust politics occurred in the same generation.

Theodore Roosevelt of the Republican Party was one of the capitalists who played a key role in the required transformation of the executive to enforce the Sherman Act. Roosevelt was a forward-looking member of his class who had achieved some success in New York politics, eventually becoming vice president and then president after William McKinley’s assassination in 1901.

The Roosevelt administration broke up several large companies, including the Northern Securities Company, the largest railroad holding company in the US. However, Roosevelt had a more far-sighted perspective. He sought to regulate monopolies to allow for state influence over their planning and direction, wielding the concentration of industry rather than simply trying to reverse it. When Roosevelt left office, his successor, William Howard Taft, a former governor in the US colonial regime in the Philippines, also broke up several large monopolies, including the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and American Tobacco. But as this failed to resolve the many crises confronting American capitalism, there was a decline in public support for both parties.

Roosevelt’s platform called to regulate the monopolies through close relationships with state agencies. / Image: Rockwood Photo Co. via Library of Congress

[Image Omitted]

The 1912 elections and the crisis of the Democrats and Republicans

Four years after leaving office, Roosevelt again ran for president, this time outside the Democrats and Republicans, riding a populist wave as the candidate of the Progressive “Bull Moose” Party in the most electorally successful third-party presidential campaign ever. Under pressure from below and from the left, the official Democratic and Republican candidates campaigned on breaking the monopolies into smaller pieces. Roosevelt, however, offered a different perspective. His platform called to regulate the monopolies through close relationships with state agencies. In a certain sense, Roosevelt had the more progressive outlook here, correctly identifying the need to plan and coordinate the economy.

Significantly, another voice in the 1912 election also put forward the need for coordinated planning—but on a working-class basis. With 6% of the vote, Eugene Debs ran the most successful socialist presidential campaign in US history. Both Debs and Roosevelt gave expression to the masses’ anger, who understood that the old ways could not continue. Along with the more than 900,000 votes for the Socialist Party, Roosevelt’s 27.4% reflected a widespread rejection of the main capitalist parties, albeit in a distorted way.

Lenin [analyzed this](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1912/nov/09.htm) at the time, describing Roosevelt’s Progressive Party as bourgeois-reformist, a reflection of the crisis of capitalism:

The old parties are products of an epoch whose task was to develop capitalism as speedily as possible. The struggle between the parties was over the question of how best to expedite and facilitate this development. The new party is a product of the present epoch, which raises the issue of the very existence of capitalism. In the USA, the freest and most advanced country, this issue is coming to the fore more clearly and broadly than anywhere else.

In the end, the Democrat Woodrow Wilson won, presiding over the next period of capitalist management, which saw an even greater concentration of capital, accelerated by World War I. The capitalist class in these years expanded the powers of the federal government and established the Federal Reserve. After the crisis of the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a distant relative of Theodore and a member of the Democratic Party, would wield these new powers in the deepest intervention into the economy yet, with the explicit goal of [stabilizing capitalism](https://socialistrevolution.org/class-struggle-and-the-new-deal/) and staving off a socialist revolution.

Lessons for today

In recent months, the idea that the tech giants need to be “busted,” or at the very least, regulated with a heavier governmental hand, has gained popularity. Both the US and Chinese states are now taking aggressive steps to regulate behaviors they had previously let go unchecked. The Chinese state is arguably able to intervene in a more muscular way than the state in the US, reflecting the different historical processes that brought the capitalist class to power in each country. But shifts in both countries express the same dynamics: the chaos of monopoly capitalism, caused by the decline of competition and the concentration of industrial capacity.

History shows that the social effects of monopoly and imperialism cannot be regulated out of existence from above. In Leon Trotsky’s “Transitional Program,” he describes how the rise of monopolies forever changed the orientation of each of the contending classes:

Liberal capitalism, based upon competition and free trade, has completely receded into the past. Its successor, monopolistic capitalism, not only does not mitigate the anarchy of the market but, on the contrary, imparts to it a particularly convulsive character. The necessity of “controlling” economy, of placing state “guidance” over industry and of “planning” is today recognized—at least in words—by almost all current bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies, from fascist to Social Democratic.

However, under the regime of private property of the means of production, in any attempt at controlling or guiding the economy, the massive potential for global economic planning can only be wielded in a distorted and monstrous way.

The stakes are extremely high. Among many other crises humanity faces, confronting the climate catastrophe will require an unprecedented marshaling of production over the next decade. Only the working class can do this, not by breaking up the monopoly energy firms but by bringing them into public ownership [under democratic workers’ control](https://socialistrevolution.org/imt-theses-on-the-climate-crisis/). So, too, with the tech giants.

### 1NC---States CP

#### The fifty states and relevant territories ought to

#### [Plan]

#### follow uniform enforcement guidelines and coordinate state antitrust cases in parallel fashion through the National Association of Attorneys General

#### increase funding for enforcement of state antitrust laws, including funding for state attorneys general and state courts, through legalizing deficit spending and borrowing to pay for antitrust enforcement

* **adjudicate antitrust cases arising from aforementioned laws in a consistent manner**

#### Scope of state criminal statutes is a question of state law.

O’Sullivan 18 (Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 2018, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,” *Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works*, 2079, https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2079/)

Assume that a Russian citizen hacked into the e-mail of the Democratic National Committee and then provided masses of stolen DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks for publication. This type of unauthorized access and release is unlawful in many countries (which will be referred to here as “States”). But where was the crime “committed”? At the hacker’s keyboard in Russia? Where the DNC’s servers are—presumably somewhere in the United States? Where WikiLeaks’ servers are—presumably not in the United States? Or perhaps where the actual and intended effect of the criminal activity was felt? If it is concluded that this criminal activity took place outside the territory of the United States— that is, extraterritorially—further critical questions include whether Congress has the constitutional power to regulate such conduct, whether Congress intended the anti-hacking statute to apply extraterritorially, and what, if any, due process limits exist on such exercises of criminal jurisdiction.

These questions have increasing importance in a world where criminal activity and criminals regularly cross national borders. The question of whether U.S. laws can or should apply to such transborder criminal activity, then, is one that courts encounter frequently. The difficulty is that the applicable analysis is unclear, particularly in criminal cases. Scholars agree that “the case law is so riddled with inconsistencies and exceptions that [attempting to bring coherence to the law on extraterritoriality] … is probably futile and maybe even counterproductive.”1 It will not surprise, then, that “the only thing courts and scholars seem to agree on is that the law in this area is a mess.”2

Despite this consensus, I will first attempt to summarize the analytical steps applied to extraterritoriality decisions, highlighting uncertainties and questions. I will then attempt to summarize the deep and rich literature on the modern Supreme Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality,3 which is today the predominant factor in extraterritoriality decisions in the usual case where the statute does not explicitly specify its geographic applicability. The Supreme Court originally applied this strong presumption against application of U.S. federal law to conduct outside U.S. territory in the 1991 case of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),4 and it has applied the presumption with vigor in its most recent extraterritoriality precedents, all of which were civil cases. I will conclude by proposing congressional action to clarify this critical but “messy” area of law.

My focus is on federal criminal law, but a preliminary note is in order regarding the question of the application of U.S. state criminal laws outside the territory of the United States. The Supreme Court has held that U.S. states may regulate extraterritorially on the same terms as the federal government, at least where the state has a legitimate interest and its laws do not conflict with acts of Congress.5 Generally the geographic scope of U.S. state criminal statutes is a question of state law. In resolving such questions, some U.S. state courts apply a presumption against extraterritoriality,6 but a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article.

### 1NC---Must Abandon Consumer Welfare – 1:15

#### Expand requires them to change underlying principles of antitrust, not merely clarify versions of applying the standard.

Hatter 90 (Terry J. Hatter, Jr., Judge, US District Court, California Central, 1990, “In re Eastport Assoc.,” 114 B.R. 686, Lexis)

[\*\*10] Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. HN7 Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "the bill would expand the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats. 1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App. 3d 15, 22, 239 Cal. Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing [\*\*11] law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### Violation---the plan does not increase the scope of antitrust because it simply clarifies where the standard can apply.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground---DA links like business confidence and innovation require broad expansions to have link uniqueness---gives us no ground against affirmatives that target specific companies or make tiny tweaks.

## Cartels

### Turn

#### Economic crises don’t cause war – they solve it

Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.

Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination

I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.

This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:

The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Growth destroys every planetary support system – extinction

Phys, 16—citing a study by Roberto Cazzolla Gatti, associate professor in ecology and biodiversity at Tomsk State University (“Western lifestyle spells the end of biodiversity,” <https://phys.org/news/2016-04-western-lifestyle-biodiversity.html>, dml)

Contrary to what many economists suggest, development is not always good for nature, a biologist at Tomsk State University argues. It is broadly accepted that biodiversity and the ecosystem are both fundamental to sustaining humanity and life on Earth, but in recent centuries, they have been subject to heavy pressures due to overexploitation. Environmental protection is also raising concerns because of our improved understanding of the interconnections between human wellness and ecosystem health. "The problem is that, even if the will to follow a sustainable lifestyle in Western countries is increasing, many developing countries are experiencing economic growth, which threatens to subject their environments to overexploitation," writes Roberto Cazzolla Gatti, associate professor in ecology and biodiversity at Tomsk State University in "Trends in human development and environmental protection," a paper published in the International Journal of Environmental Studies. This could be a catastrophe for the planet. This study compares the trends seen in the Living Planet Index (LPI) and the Human Development Index (HDI) and applies an economic-ecologic historical analysis. The TSU ecologist suggests that societies follow common development patterns as they move from an indigenous lifestyle to an undeveloped society before entering a transitional phase as they move toward a developed state. As they go through this process, each society exploits local, regional and sometimes global natural resources to nourish its economic growth. "Today, we can see that higher-latitude countries populated by 2 billion people consume their entire environmental capital in one year, while lower-latitude countries that are home to more than 5 billion people are depleting resources at a growing rate that will in a few years catch up with Western levels," Cazzolla Gatti says. "If developing countries do not implement strategies to skip this 'intermediate' stage of natural resource overuse during the intense growth phase, the Earth's systems will not be able to support the global biodiversity and ecosystems that sustain humanity. The planet is facing a series of challenges that could lead to a significant loss of ecosystem integrity. These challenges are caused by human demand, natural resource and space use. The recent agreement signed at the United Nations climate summit in Paris (December 2015) has been hailed as historic, ground-breaking and unprecedented. However, the targets it sets seem so ambitious that many climate analysts do not believe they will have any impact on the current climatic situation. This agreement aims to limit temperature increases to a level below 2° C, above pre-industrial levels, and recognizes that avoiding 1.5° C of warming "would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change." Unfortunately, participating countries' emissions reduction commitments are not sufficient to achieve these targets and it seems impossible to avoid the 1.5°C limit without development of "negative emissions," such as absorbing carbon dioxide out of the air using technologies that are still at worst unavailable and at best ineffective. "In addition to climate change, the major cause of the reduction in biodiversity we have seen in recent times is the associated rates of habitat destruction and degradation. Over half of the estimated original extent of temperate broadleaf forests had already been converted to agriculture, forest plantations and urban areas by 1950," Cazzolla Gatti writes. "In contrast, deforestation and land-use change accelerated in the tropics after 1950. Freshwater ecosystem exploitation has moved well beyond levels that can be sustained, even at current demand. Moreover, forecasts suggest that demand for water will continue to rise globally. Add to this the impact of the increasing global demand for palm oil products, which continues to be a key factor behind the recent dramatic decline in forest cover in Southeast Asia," Gatti says. "Data suggests that two orangutan species have already undergone a tenfold decrease in population size over the 20th century and many populations are now at very low numbers. Looking at the marine environment, the high demand for fish and fish products combined with overcapacity in the global fishing fleet and inefficient fishing techniques have led to massive overfishing." This alarming study suggests that societies seem to follow common development patterns and few countries are currently living sustainably, with the majority overexploiting natural resources and ecosystems. This is fundamentally unsustainable and there is no end in sight. Moving away from this will be anything but painless. In coming years, 5 to 7 billion people will follow the global patterns described in this study, and ecosystems and biodiversity will continue to be subjected to a high level of stress with no assurance of resilience.

#### Growth is unsustainable – Jevon’s paradox, biophysical requirements, land use, lack of decoupling, and lack of sequestration.

Kallis et al. 18 (Giorgos Kallis, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, was a Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece, et al., 5/22/18, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Matthias\_Schmelzer/publication/325492725\_Research\_on\_Degrowth/links/5b75788892851ca65064864e/Research-on-Degrowth.pdf, “Research On Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, pp. 296-298)//ICH-EC

3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE LIMITS OF GREEN GROWTH Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources. Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects. Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42). Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40). Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These **declines are nowhere near the 8–10%,** year-afteryear **reductions** in carbon emissions **required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C** (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34). Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51). Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44). Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability. Advancing a position of “a-growth,” van den Bergh (54) proposes ignoring GDP and implementing a global carbon price, indifferent to what its effect on growth turns out to be. Ignoring GDP is a normative position—but at the end, the economy will either grow or not, and if it does not, then there should be plans for managing without growth. Given how entrenched GDP growth is in existing institutional and political structures, a-growth approaches must be advanced as part of broader systemic change (55). Is it possible to secure a decent standard of living for all while throughput and output degrow? Substantive evidence indicates that prosperity does not depend on high levels of production and consumption. Kubiszewski et al. (56) find that the Genuine Progress Indicator, an indicator that includes environmental and social costs alongside output, peaked in 1978, despite subsequent global growth. A similar indicator, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, has stayed at the same levels in the United States since 1950, despite a threefold growth of GDP (57). Wealthier countries on average have higher levels of life expectancy and education than poorer ones, but above a certain level of GDP, income does not make a difference in wellbeing—equality does. Satisfactory levels of wellbeing are achieved by countries such as Vietnam or Costa Rica at a fraction (one-third or less) of the output, energy, or resource use of countries such as the United States. Even the lower levels of resource use of mid-income countries, however, would not be sustainable if they were to be generalized to the planet as a whole. No country currently satisfies social wellbeing standards while staying within its share of planetary boundaries, suggesting that radical changes in provisioning systems are necessary (58). Wealthier people within a country are on average happier than others, but in the long run, overall happiness does not increase as a country’s income rises (59). Nuances of this incomehappiness paradox depend on the sample of countries included and how one defines and asks about happiness. Within societies, individuals with higher incomes evaluate their lives as better than others, but do not enjoy better emotional wellbeing (60). Income determines social rank, and rank affects individuals’ assessments of their lives. Growth does not change relative rank or relative access to positional goods (those signifying position) but it does inflate expectations and prices of material goods, increasing frustration (61). Relative comparisons matter for personal wellbeing in low-income and high-income countries; for both, the more equally income is distributed, the happier people are (62). Pro-environmental behaviors and sharing are also strongly associated with personal wellbeing (63). This suggests that an economic contraction may not impact wellbeing negatively if accompanied by redistribution, sharing, and value shifts (34). There is no political constituency currently demanding degrowth, but a survey of 1,008 people in Spain finds that one-third prefers ignoring or stopping growth altogether (64). Even so, the majority, including those in this one-third, want growth rates in the order of 3% or higher (64). This may not be as paradoxical as it first seems: One may be aware that continued growth is impossible or catastrophic but also sense that capitalist societies need growth to avoid collapse. The stability of current economies does depend on growth—growth is necessary to avoid unemployment, reduce debt, and fund public services. Recent economic research, however, shows that this is not necessarily so—under certain conditions, economies may function well without growth. We now turn to this research.

#### Decline causes transition – changes entrenched models of growth and empowers calls for degrowth

Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” *Ecology and Society*, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of more radical systemic change.The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review.The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?The economic crisis has an empirical basis in factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’ outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated. The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena. Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying responses.This economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although the economy now seems on a path to recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist.From a countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more apparent the need for structural change. This becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see O’Riordan 2013).Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces, and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth 2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and “the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled, changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change.We use here narratives of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social (counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy.Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).

### I/L

#### No internal link uniqueness---they have card zero saying that batteries are insufficient now. -

#### Grid is fine

Fisher 15—IER Economist (Travis, “ASSESSING EMERGING POLICY THREATS TO THE U.S. POWER GRID,” <http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Threats-to-U.S.-Power-Grid.compressed.pdf>, dml)

Electric reliability in the U.S. is **excellent overall**, which is a testament to the men and women working in power plants and control rooms across the country. Aside from two major blackouts (1965 and 2003), electricity consumers in the U.S. have not been subjected to **persistent**, **region-wide blackouts** —unlike less developed nations 8 with less reliable electric systems. 9 Given the positive track record of America’s power grid, it is no surprise that some experts characterize the grid as “**underrated**.” According to a 2014 report 10 by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (**NERC**)—which is the U.S.’s federally designated electric reliability organization—the grid **remains stable**: The availability of the bulk transmission system remained high from 2008 to 2013. The [alternating current] transmission circuit availability remained above 97 percent, and transmission transformer availability was above 98 percent for the 2010 to 2013 period (unavailability includes both forced and planned outages). High transmission availability demonstrates that the [bulk power system] is able to **perform reliably** over **a variety of operating conditions**.11

### Heg bad

#### Status quo decline causes a transition to a multilateral system that solves their impacts

Kupchan ’14 (Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University and former Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana”, 5/16/14, *wcp*)

It is of important geopolitical consequence that hegemony has normative dimensions and that power transitions entail clashes among competing norms. The world is entering a period of transformation as power shifts from the West to the rising rest. One school of thought—which dominates in Washington—holds that emerging powers are poised to embrace the existing international order; Western norms are universal norms, and the dictates of globalization are ensuring their worldwide spread. According to Ikenberry, “The United States’ global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty- first century.” The West should “sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible” to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. “China and other emerging great powers,” he concludes, “do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.”82 The analysis in this article suggests that such conventional wisdom is illusory; emerging powers will not readily embrace the order on offer from the West. Regardless of the presumed functionality of the current order from a liberal, transactional perspective, emerging powers—China, India, Brazil, Turkey, to name a few—are following their own paths to modernity based on their own cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic trajectories. Their nor-mative and social orientations will produce quite disparate approaches to building and managing international order. Unlike during earlier periods of multipolarity, when different hegemonies often operated independently of each other, in today’s globalized world, multiple hegemonic zones will intensely and continuously interact with each other. In light of its growing economic and military power, China is likely to pose the most significant challenge to the ordering norms of Pax Americana. It is true that China for now is not challenging many of the rules associated with the Western liberal order, particularly when it comes to commerce. But as all great powers have done throughout history, China will likely seek to recast that order when it has the power to do so. Indeed, China is set to become the world’s leading economy by the end of the next decade.83 Drawing on its historical, cultural, and socioeconomic trajectory, Beijing is poised to bring to the fore a set of ordering norms that contrast sharply with those of Pax Americana. The normative orientation of China’s past approach to exercising hegemony is hardly a reliable predictor of the ordering norms that might shape a Chinese sphere of influence in the future. Nonetheless, the historical record provides a basis for informed speculation.84 China may well aspire to resurrect in East Asia a sphere of influence that is arrayed in concentric circles around a Sinicized core. Through this tiered structure, China might attempt to exercise a brand of regional hegemony modeled on the tributary system. China’s material primacy would serve as the foundation for its economic, strategic, and cultural centrality. Its neighbors would demonstrate deference to Beijing through both policy and ritual, but they would maintain their autonomy and their independent relations with each other. Nonetheless, China would become the region’s strategic and economic hub, playing a role similar to that of the United States in the Americas. Beijing could well unfurl its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, laying claim to primacy in Northeast Asia and guardianship of the region’s sea lanes. Indeed, Beijing has already ramped up maritime activities in the East China Sea and South China Sea and rejected Washington’s call for addressing the area’s territorial disputes through multilateral negotiation. Such a Sinocentric brand of hegemony in East Asia is of course in- compatible with the current security architecture in which the United States continues to serve as the region’s geopolitical hub. Accordingly, the United States and China have strong incentives to turn to diplomacy to tame their relationship over the course of this decade—before the naval balance in the western Pacific becomes more equal. On the table will have to be both the material and the normative dimensions of order. If Beijing and Washington succeed in reaching a meeting of the minds, a peaceful power transition in East Asia may be in the offing. If not, a historic confrontation may well loom. Should diplomacy fail to avert rivalry, Sino-American competition may nonetheless fall short of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War. China and the United States are economically interdependent whereas the Soviet Union and the United States carved out separate economic blocs. Moreover, China’s geopolitical ambition, at least for the foreseeable future, seems focused primarily on East Asia, suggesting that rivalry with the United States could be more contained than the global competition that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union. China’s regional ambitions are, however, poised to clash head-on with America’s determination to maintain strategic primacy in Northeast Asia. Even if it does not match the hostility of the Cold War, the resulting confrontation could well resemble the naval race between Great Britain and Germany that commenced at the turn of the twentieth century.85 Although Wilhelmine Germany did not threaten the global dominance of the Royal Navy, its naval buildup in the European theater fueled a spiral of hostility that culminated in World War I. On the socioeconomic front, China has successfully fashioned a stable compact between its ruling elite and its rising bourgeoisie. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Imperial China was particularly adept at co-opting a rising merchant class into the existing political order. The same goes for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today. The CCP has deliberately incorporated China’s rapidly expanding middle class into the centralized state, ensuring at least for now that the spread of private wealth does not undermine the party’s unitary grip on power. As Kellee Tsai notes, “China’s capitalists are pragmatic and creative but they are not budding democrats.” “Economic growth,” she concludes, “has not created a prodemocratic capitalist class.”86 The status quo certainly faces challenges from economic inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, factional strife within the CCP, and restive minority populations. But meritocratic entry into public service, the continued competence of China’s leaders, and governance that is broadly aimed at shared societal gains rather than rent-seeking augur in favor of political stasis. From this perspective, China’s ascent should not be expected to transform its socioeconomic order along Western lines any time soon. On the contrary, its domestic order is likely to continue shaping its economic and geopolitical ascent, favoring policies that advantage the compact between the party and the middle class. If so, China is poised to emerge as a hegemonic power well before it democratizes, meaning that the world’s leading economy will not ascribe to the dominant political norms associated with the Western liberal order. To be sure, the CCP’s partial embrace of a market economy and its growing concern with legitimacy and accountability do moderate the “ideological distance” between Beijing and Washington.87 Nonetheless, China and the United States remain miles apart on fundamental norms, including human rights, the rule of law, and representative government. That gap may necessitate international deliberation about what constitutes legitimate forms of governance. One option would be to associate legitimacy with responsible governance rather than procedural democracy. States that govern so as to meet the needs and fulfill the aspirations of their citizens, not just those that hold multiparty elections, would be considered in good standing.88 Such revision to the normative foundations of Pax Americana may be needed to promote normative consensus as Western hegemony wanes. The ethnocentrism of China’s imperial past suggests that a new era of Chinese hegemony would likely be characterized by cultural particularism, not universalism.89 As it has already begun to do, Beijing will continue to develop a worldwide commercial network affording the extraction of raw materials and the development of export markets. But China shows few signs of wanting to export globally its own cultural and ideological norms—in sharp contrast with the universalizing ambition of both Britain and the United States. In this respect, China’s ascent may mean that cultural dividing lines will matter more than they have during the era of American hegemony. China would accept—and perhaps even encourage—a global order characterized by pluralism. Whereas the United States has sought to construct an international order that rests on universal rules, norms, and institutions, China might favor greater diversity and the devolution of authority to regional bodies that represent cultural groupings. Just as China has long argued that America’s political and social values are not appropriate for the Chinese, so too would a hegemonic China likely deem it inappropriate and unnecessary for the Chinese to propagate their own norms beyond a Sinicized sphere of influence in East Asia. In this respect, a hegemonic China would likely welcome a more variegated global order, with different regions guided by their own cultural, social, and political norms. Contra Samuel Huntington’s prediction of a clash of civilizations, regional groupings that fall along civilizational lines are by no means destined to collide with one another.90 However, managing relations among them would require a level of political and ideological pluralism inconsistent with the universalism of Pax Americana. As for its commercial orientation, China’s ongoing economic success rests on a hybrid economic model that combines state control with market mechanisms. So-called “state capitalism” has afforded multiple advantages, including long-range strategic planning, programmatic investment in infras- tructure, and a regulatory framework that has helped mitigate the financial turbulence that has recently plagued the more open economies of the democratic West. To be sure, the Chinese economy faces multiple vulnerabilities, including unfavorable demographic trends; a relationship among the state, industry, and finance that impairs competition; and a lack of entrepreneurial innovation. Nonetheless, success breeds continuity. Beijing will likely continue to place a premium on the profitability of the export sector and state-owned enterprises, which enriches party elites as well as private entrepreneurs. It will also concentrate on expanding international access to the energy supplies and raw materials needed to fuel its manufacturing and industrial base. Its foreign economic policy is poised to remain extractive and mercantilist, with little emphasis on using economic penetration as an instrument of political reform. State-planning at home and mercantilism abroad are set to be enduring features of Beijing’s commercial strategy. As its economy continues to expand, China will remain interested in embracing, at least to some degree, the rules of open multilateralism. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that although China joined the World Trade Organization over a decade ago, it is continuing to practice a state-led brand of capitalism—the state sector still produces some 40 percent of the country’s GDP—and to exploit concessions won during accession negotiations to use the body to its advantage.91 In this respect, it would be illusory to expect Beijing to bend increasingly to prevailing international rules as China’s power rises. On the contrary, as Chinese power grows, Beijing will likely bend the rules to favor China’s political and economic needs and norms—just as all great powers before it have done as they emerge as hegemons. Indeed, China’s leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Council and the BRICS grouping, as well as its support for a regional trade group that excludes the United States, reveals that Beijing is already seeking to circumvent institutions dominated by the West, not work within them. China will not be alone among rising powers in pursuing a new brand of international governance that reflects its own interests and normative orientations. A key challenge for coming decades will be to forge a major power consensus that embraces a broad array of different ordering norms. As Zarakol warns, “There may be a limit to how long the majority of the world’s population will tolerate living under an international system whose rules they have very little input in.”92 The West will have to make room for the alternative approaches and visions of rising powers and prepare for an international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary ideational and normative anchor. If the next international system is to be characterized by a rules-based order rather than competitive anarchy, it will have to be predicated on great power consensus and toleration of political and social diversity rather than universalization of the liberal international order erected during the West’s watch. Multipolarity and normative diversity suggest the onset of a more regionalized international system.

#### Attempts to sustain hegemony force a conflict with China—triggers World War III

Whitney, 6/17/2015 – [Mike Whitney, Correspondent at the Centre for Research on Globalization, 6-17-2015, Seven Days in May? US Global Hegemony, “Asymmetric Warfare” Directed against China, Global Research | Centre for Research on Globalization, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/seven-days-in-may-us-global-hegemony-asymmetric-warfare-directed-against-china/5456358>] Jeong

“Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally.” -Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J.Tellis, [Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf), The Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, March 2015 “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” -Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China The United States will do whatever is necessary to maintain its dominant position in the world. Less than two years ago, no one thought that Washington would topple a regime on Moscow’s doorstep, insert a US-backed stooge in Kiev, arm and train neo-Nazi extremists in the Ukrainian Army, instigate and oversee a vicious war of aggression in the East, threaten to deploy NATO to within five hundred miles of the Russian capital, reassemble the Iron Curtain by building up forces, weaponry and missile systems in E. Europe and the Balkans, and repeatedly provoke a nuclear-armed adversary (Russia) by launching asymmetrical attacks on its economy, its financial system and its currency. The reason Washington pursued such a risky strategy is because EU-Russian economic integration posed a direct threat to US global hegemony, so steps had to be taken to thwart the project. The US used all the tools at its disposal to drive a wedge between Brussels and Moscow, to sabotage the plan to create a free trade zone from “Lisbon to Vladivostok”, and to prevent the emergence of a new rival. Washington powerbrokers did what they felt they had to do to preserve their lofty position in the current world order. Now their focus has shifted to the Asia-Pacific where they intend to take similar action against another potential rival, China. According to the Economist, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will surpass that of the United States by 2021. In other words, if present trends persist, China will become the world’s biggest economy in less than a decade. But what are the chances that present trends will continue if Beijing is embroiled in a conflagration with the US; a conflagration where the US turns China’s trading partners against Beijing like it did with Moscow, a conflagration in which more of China’s resources are devoted to national defense rather than economic growth, a conflagration in which oil shipments from the Middle East are interrupted or cut off completely? If any of these things were to happen, China would probably slip into recession dashing its chances of becoming the world’s biggest economy. The point here is that China’s rise is not inevitable as many people seem to think. It depends on things that China cannot completely control, like Washington’s provocations in the Spratly Islands which are designed to slow China’s growth by isolating Beijing and drawing it into a confrontation that saps its energy and depletes its resources. There was an interesting article on the US Naval Institute’s website titled “Asymmetric Warfare, American Style” that explains in part what the Pentagon may be trying to achieve by harassing Beijing over its harmless land reclamation activities in the Spratlys. Here’s a clip from the article: “In the nuclear age, guarding the homeland from an unlimited counterstroke is about more than merely preventing invasion. Forestalling nuclear escalation means keeping the scope and duration of combat operations low enough—and thus unprovocative enough—that Beijing would not countenance using doomsday weapons to get its way. It is important, then, for Washington to limit its efforts through the type and amount of force deployed, staying below the nuclear threshold. American strategists’ goal should be to design operations that insert “disposal” forces….to support allies while making life difficult for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” ([Asymmetric Warfare, American Style](http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-04/asymmetric-warfare-american-style), Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, US Naval Institute) This, I imagine, is the objective of the current policy; to inflict maximum punishment on China without actually triggering a nuclear war. It’s a tightrope act that Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter feels he can manage judging by the way he has gradually increased the pressure on China and then watched to see what the reaction is. And there are indications that the Carter method is working too. On June 16, China’s Foreign Ministry announced that it planned to complete land reclamation projects within days. While the announcement is a clear stand-down on Beijing’s part, it did include one face-saving proviso that “China would follow up by building infrastructure to carry out functions ranging from maritime search and rescue to environmental conservation and scientific research.” The carefully-worded statement will be taken by Washington as a sign that Beijing is looking for a way to end the crisis without appearing like it’s caving in. China’s reaction is likely to convince Carter that his approach is working, that China can be bullied into making concessions in its own backyard, and that more pressure can be applied without risking a nuclear war. Thus, rather than ending the dispute, the Foreign Ministry’s announcement has paved the way for an escalation of hostilities. Carter’s approach to China is not particularly unique, in fact, it has a lot in common with the Soviet containment strategy propounded by the late George F. Kennan who said: The U.S. “has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” While it’s clear that US policy relies heavily on coercion, the US is being far more reckless in its dealings with China than it was with the Soviet Union. Sec-Def Carter made his demands on China (to end all land reclamation activities) without ever seeking a settlement through normal diplomatic channels. This suggests that the US doesn’t really want peace, but wants to use the Spratly’s for some other purpose, as a pretext for ratcheting up the tensions, for demonizing China in the media, for cobbling together an anti-China coalition in the region, and for encircling China to the West. Keep in mind, that the so called pivot to Asia –which President Obama referred to as the United States “top priority”– is, at its heart, a plan for economic supremacy. The foofaraw in the Spratlys is just the military component of the broader “Grand Strategy” which is aimed at dominating the prosperous Asian markets for the next century. Carter admitted as much in a speech he gave at the McCain Institute earlier in the year where he said the rebalance was about “access to growing markets” ..”to help boost our exports and our economy”…”and cement our influence and leadership in the fastest-growing region in the world.” These are Carter’s own words, and they help to explain why the US is hectoring China. Washington needs an excuse for intensifying hostilities in the South China Sea so it can use its military to achieve its political and economic goals. At the same time, any retaliation on China’s part will be used as a justification for upping the ante; for deploying more troops to the region, for enlisting proxies to challenge Beijing in its own territorial waters, and for tightening the naval cordon to the West. The Obama administration is fully committed to the new policy, in fact, there was an interesting report in last week’s Washington Times about the sacking of high-ranking government officials who were insufficiently hostile towards China. Here’s a clip from the article: “The Obama administration appears to be in the early phase of a policy shift on China. Tougher rhetoric and policies, most recently demonstrated by remarks in Asia from Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, coincide with the departures of two key officials long known for advocating more conciliatory policies toward Beijing… Paul Heer, who for years held the influential post of national intelligence officer for East Asia….was known for a steadfast bias that sought to play down the various threats posed by China in favor of more conciliatory views (while) A second major personnel change was the departure last week of the White House’s senior China specialist, Evan Medeiros, who ….was regarded by critics as among the most pro-China policymakers in the White House’s highly centralized foreign policy and national security power structure.” ([Ashton Carter’s remarks suggest an Obama policy shift on China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/10/inside-the-ring-ashton-carters-china-remarks-signa/#ixzz3cr5FOZKm), Washington Times) This is what’s going on behind the scenes. The doves are getting their pink slips while the hawks are sharpening their knives. If it looks like the uber-confident Carter is setting policy, it’s because he is. Obama seems to have been sidelined while the Pentagon is calling the shots. Does the name “Seven Days in May” ring a bell? So what can we expect now that foreign policy is in the hands of a hawkish neocon who believes that the US must preserve its dominant position in the world by quashing all potential rivals? What we can expect is more military adventurism, more needlessly provocative displays of force which increase the probability of another world war.

#### The aff’s attempt to prop up hegemony only destabilizes regional powers and ensure prolif—view the aff’s args through a lens of security fearmongering

Posen 14 – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, “Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24, 2014, tony)

Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction, partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own security, and U.S. political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S. security position. 124 They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to one of these good things will lead to damage to other good things, so the United States must defend all. The “fragile and interconnected” argument is politically effective. By accident or design, the argument derives an inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear, uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most targets of the argument do not know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these connections; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and fear is a powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of causation can be made to seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your country has overwhelming power. It is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S. values such as liberty and democracy depend on U.S. power and leadership. The argument does not stand close scrutiny. First, it obscures the inherently strong security position of the United States, which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed, precisely because they are facts. It takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the United States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to produce another and another until the small problems become big ones, or the collection of problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these connections are valid in any particular case will always be open to debate. Even if the connections are plausible, however, it is unlikely given the inherent U.S. security position that the United States need prop up the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal Hegemony often elide the difference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to others, and those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheap-riders and reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare, security, or power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States, however, pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated because the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists argue that U.S. commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit the spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict, and that this helps keep the United States out of wars that would emerge in these unstable regions. This chain of interconnected benefits is not self-evident. United States activism does change the nature of regional competitions; it does not necessarily suppress them. For example, where U.S. commitments encourage “free-riding,” this attracts coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the United States encourages “reckless driving,” it produces regional instability. United States activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes extended deterrence commitments to discourage proliferation, the U.S. military is encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are themselves destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty years, the United States ends up in regional wars in any case. Fourth, one key set of interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between U.S. security provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125 Professor Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free trade and finance would more easily survive crises if there was a “leader,” a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies could “save” a system in crisis, which would also have the interest and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126 Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon would be even better. 127 Robert Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a “liberal” hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system, which would make it more acceptable to the “subjects” and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal of hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope of this book. But this theory has fallen into desuetude in the study of international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not produce a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics, security, and institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a sense of their relative importance and interdependence, and how they work in practice. The theory is difficult to test because there are only two cases: nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, and post–World War II United States, and they operated in very different ways under very different conditions. Finally, testing of narrow versions of the theory did not show compelling results. 129 These problems should make us somewhat skeptical about making the theory the basis for U.S. grand strategy.

## Indigenous Regimes Adv

### AT: Brazil

#### No internal link---Brazil continued deforestation---their evidence doesn’t assume lack of legal regimes that prevent illegal logging---higher growth means there’s MORE incentive to destroy the amazon for cattle.

### AT: Food

#### Tons of alt causes---poverty, lack of governance regimes, imperialism, etc.

#### The countries most likely to draw in great powers have the best resilience.

Cliffe ’16 [Sarah; 3-29-2016; Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University; “Food Security, Nutrition, and Peace,” Center on International Cooperation at New York Universityhttp://cic.nyu.edu/news\_commentary/food-security-nutrition-and-peace]

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity and conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations.

Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) is indirect rather than direct.

What makes some countries more resilient than others?

Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict. Essentially, the two important factors in determining their resilience are:

First, whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009 drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of course have been one factor amongst many but it would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary driver of the Syrian conflict.

Second, whether countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens, providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance. During the 2007-2008 food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent. This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.

# 2NC

## DOJ

#### Green

Simmons ‘18 [Jay; 2018; Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, J.D. Candidate, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; Southern California Law Review; “What's in a Claim: Challenging Criminal Prosecutions under the FTAIA's Domestic Effects Exception,” vol. 92, p. 128-168]

A final consideration concerns the distinct remedies that the overall statutory scheme envisions for civil and criminal antitrust violations. According to regulators' conception of the Sherman Act and its penalties, violations "may be prosecuted as civil or criminal offenses," and punishments for civil and criminal offenses vary. 153 For example, available relief under the law encompasses penalties and custodial sentences for criminal offenses, whereas civil plaintiffs may "obtain injunctive and treble damage relief for violations of the Sherman Act." 154 Regulators also recognize that the law envisions distinct means of enforcing criminal and civil offenses under the Sherman Act. For example, the DOJ retains the "sole responsibility for the criminal enforcement" of criminal offenses and "criminally prosecutes traditional per se offenses of the law."1'55 In civil proceedings, private plaintiffs and the federal government may seek equitable relief and treble damage relief for Sherman Act violations. 156

#### The plan solves the tradeoff link – private litigation takes cases off the government’s docket.

Harrington ‘15 [Joseph; January 29; Patrick T. Harker Professor, Department of Business Economics & Public Policy, at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; *CPI Antitrust Chronicle*, “The Comity-Deterrence Tradeoff and the FTAIA: Motorola Mobility Revisited,” <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-comity-deterrence-trade-off-and-the-ftaia-motorola-mobility-revisited/>; KS]

Of greater relevance is the second reason for the lack of public enforcement, which is that the government suspects unlawful collusion but chooses not to litigate. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has limited resources, which means all possible cases cannot be pursued. Furthermore, the presence of a resource constraint impacts the type of cases that are pursued. These days, the DOJ’s caseload is heavily oriented to cases involving the leniency program but not all forms of collusion lend themselves to a firm receiving amnesty. A member of a hard-core cartel engaged in a per se offense can expect to receive leniency if it is the first to come forward but there are many cases of collusion that do not involve behavior that is per se unlawful. Given the lower threshold for a conviction in a civil case, private litigation has been, and will continue to be, essential in prosecuting these less flagrant, but no less harmful, forms of collusion.  
While it is difficult to document case selection by the DOJ, there is certainly evidence consistent with it being a substantive factor. In noting that the DOJ obtained convictions in 92 percent of 699 cases filed over 1992 to 2008, Professors Robert Lande and Joshua Davis comment:17

The DOJ appears much more willing to tolerate a false negative (a failure to prosecute a violation of the antitrust laws) than a false positive (litigating a case when in fact there was no violation). In other words, it appears the DOJ chooses not to pursue litigation in many meritorious cases, perhaps at least in part because it lacks the necessary resources. This may well create a need for private litigation as a complement to government enforcement of the antitrust laws.

#### The DOJ has limited resources – the plan quickly diverts funds

Hudak 18 – PhD in Political Science @ Vandy, deputy director of the Center for Effective Public Management and a senior fellow in Governance Studies. His research examines questions of presidential power in the contexts of administration, personnel, and public policy (John, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/01/04/why-sessions-is-wrong-to-reverse-federal-marijuana-policy/)

As I have noted previously on the Fresh Toast, the Attorney General does not have unlimited resources to enforce federal law. Every day federal prosecutors make choices about which crimes and cases to pursue. Chasing after the thousands of legal marijuana growers, processers, and dispensaries and the tens of thousands of people they employ will cost DEA significant amounts of federal tax dollars. Add to that the costs US Attorneys will incur prosecuting those individuals and representing the government on appeals. That very quickly eats into the same Department of Justice budget that could be spent fighting terrorism, combating cybercrime, dealing with the opioid epidemic, eradicating MS-13 or dozens of other federal law enforcement priorities. These are the choices the Attorney General has to make. It is clear the public would rather dollars be spent on other priorities, but budgets are limited and the rescission of Cole complicates that.

#### Tradeoff is specifically true for antitrust---they’re operating with thin margins

**Frank, 1-5**-2021, "Managing Antitrust Risk in the Biden Administration," Fried Frank, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8f2eaf8e-db8e-47d5-80c5-c912e3042591)

Further, despite a record number of litigated cases, the budget at the antitrust agencies is insufficient to match the rhetoric of more enforcement. The DOJ had 25% fewer full-time employees in 2019 than it had 10 years earlier9 and the FTC recently imposed a hiring freeze. With limited resources, the agencies are forced to make important tradeoffs in deciding what matters to challenge, settle, or walk away from. Indeed, Commissioner Wilson reportedly voted against bringing a lawsuit to block CoStar's acquisition of RentPath, in part, because of limited FTC resources.10 Although the agencies will receive a modest budget increase for the current fiscal year,11 it is far short of what some think is needed.12 As antitrust enforcement has become a bipartisan issue, a significant increase in the antitrust agencies' budgets in the future is likely.

#### No new antitrust filing is imminent

Mills, 9-7-2021, Chris, "DOJ reportedly preparing new Google antitrust case," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/policy/technology/571104-doj-reportedly-preparing-new-google-antitrust-case> -- Iowa

The Department of Justice is readying an antitrust lawsuit against Google aimed at the search giant’s role in the ad tech market, multiple outlets have reported.

While a filing is not imminent, according to a Politico report, the agency could move forward with the case before President Biden’s pick to run the DOJ’s antitrust team makes it through the Senate.

Attorney General Merrick Garland and Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta would reportedly make the final call if Jonathan Kanter is not yet confirmed.

#### Fiat makes the plan distinct – current actions won’t hit courts until 2023

Guichard, 9-8 – Bradley, “Google In The DOJ Crosshairs - Again. Shareholders Unmoved,” Seeking Alpha, <https://seekingalpha.com/article/4454040-google-in-the-doj-crosshairs-again-shareholders-unmoved> -- Iowa

The immediate effect of the announcement of new charges against Alphabet was virtually nil, as is the correct response. Analyst D.A. Davidson notes the "curious" reaction from investors. However, this reaction is perfectly logical. These lawsuits take years to ever get to court in many cases, and then additional years on appeal. For instance, the first case against Google filed in October 2020 is not scheduled to go to trial until late 2023. This could be delayed even further by pretrial developments. Next, if Google were to lose and is forced to divest from YouTube or change certain other non-competitive practices, history from Standard Oil through AT&T and Microsoft says that shareholders will ultimately continue to profit. Highly successful companies find ways to adjust to changing conditions in order to continue their success and the scrutiny can also spur advancement through necessity. The end results of the Big Tech crackdown are unknown, but history says shareholders are well served to buy and hold.

## Indigenous Regimes CP

#### CP allows foreign nations to develop their own capacity---yellow.

1ac Briggs & Bitton ‘15 [John; Daniel; 2015; Antitrust and litigation counsel of choice for dozens of major companies in the United States, Asia, Europe and Scandinavia. Client demand for his work has focused on antitrust, M&A and complex civil litigation; An attorney who represents clients in the San Francisco, California area; "Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Extraterritoriality and Comity." https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/Heisenberg%27s%20Uncertainty%20Principle\_Extraterritorialty%20and%20Comity.16TSCJ327.pdf]

In a variety of settings foreign governments have expressed and are expressing concerns about the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The United States occupies a unique position in global trade and finance. The United States also has enacted far-reaching legislation involving commerce, banking and finance, business conduct, mergers and acquisitions, foreign corrupt practices, and a variety of other matters. The extraterritorial application of laws in these areas challenges the sovereignty of other nations and is often viewed as offensive. In antitrust, the United States’ influence is the result of its status as the world’s largest importer of goods and services.18 In finance, this influence is the result of the U.S. dollar’s status as the international unit of account: “Pretty much any dollar transaction— even between two non-US entities—will go through New York City at some point, where it comes under the jurisdiction of US authorities.”19

The rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. laws has ruffled the feathers of foreign governments for a long time, beginning essentially with the cluster of private and government actions in the Uranium cartel cases back in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Close American allies, including Australia, Canada, France, South Africa, the UK, and others, reacted with hostility to the extraterritorial activism of the domestic judiciary by enacting “blocking” and “claw back” legislation.20 Such reactions included the enactment of laws by the United Kingdom and Canada that prohibit enforcement of foreign judgments awarding multiple damages21 and laws passed by the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario that limit or prohibit the removal of documents in response to a foreign order.22

More recently, a number of governments have expressed their concerns about the application of U.S. laws abroad through amicus briefs, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom:23 most of the United States’ top fifteen trading partners.

These foreign governments have expressed a fairly wide variety of concerns about the potential for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to interfere with those governments’ policy decisions on such matters as liability, procedure, and damages. While most governments have regulatory regimes in place to police, for example, securities fraud and cartel behavior, these differ in many regards both from the American approach and also from each other, reflecting different cultural, social, and economic factors. These differences include the required showing for liability (e.g., definition of materiality in securities fraud cases),24 procedural protections (e.g., class-action formation and punitive) damages.26 Applying U.S. law to actors, conduct, and effects appropriately considered under a set of foreign laws undermines a foreign government’s ability to govern its own domain and, in the end, becomes an affront to its sovereignty.

Stepping on the toes of foreign governments’ regulatory regimes also risks stymying the international development of policies and regulations beneficial to the United States. Countries without well-developed regulatory apparatuses are less likely to develop them if the behavior is already policed by private plaintiffs in the United States or if the apparatuses would see their policy choices effectively overruled by U.S. policies.27

Foreign governments have also taken the view that extraterritorial application of treble damages threatens to undermine their own enforcement efforts. For example, they claim availability of private treble damages in the United States against their national companies for local conduct may have a detrimental effect on foreign leniency programs. These programs are a key tool for them in rooting out cartel activity, which has traditionally proven difficult to detect and prosecute.28 “These leniency policies seek to balance the interests of disclosure, deterrence, and punishment,” but “disclosure and reform are greatly hindered when a company risks the imposition of treble damages in a U.S. court for confessing to another nation or authority that it has participated in an international conspiracy.”29 When that reach is expanded outside of U.S. consumers in a U.S. court, “the prospect of ruinous civil liability in U.S. courts far outweighs the benefits most companies would receive from participating in an amnesty program.”30 And as Germany and Belgium informed the Supreme Court in Empagran,31 “[h]istorically, other nations have bristled at extraterritorial applications of United States antitrust laws. These concerns have resulted in foreign governments taking a number of measures to counter what they perceive to be an illegitimate encroachment into their sovereignty.”32

## Indigenous Regimes

#### They don’t escalate



Atkins 16—PhD Candidate in Energy, Environment & Resilience at the University of Bristol (Ed, “Environmental Conflict: A Misnomer?,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/05/12/environmental-conflict-a-misnomer/>, dml)

It is important to note that such conflicts **predominantly occur** on an **intra-state basis**, **rather** than **between two nations**. **International conflict** over environmental factors remain **unlikely** – whether due to the **robust nature** of the world trade system and dynamics of supply and demand or to the **spread of small arms** transforming the notion of traditional conflict (Deudney, 1990). An important example can be found in the assertions of **water wars**. Although the management of rivers is often complicated by their crossing of territorial boundaries and nations dependent on water from beyond their borders (Egypt, Hungary and Mauritania all rely on international watercourses for 90 per cent of their water), an international conflict **exclusively over** possession of and access to a shared water source is **still to occur**. The reasons for this are simply, as Wolf (1998: 251) states, ‘War over water seems **neither strategically rational**, **hydrographically effective**, **nor economically viable**.’ At the **international level**, the costs **outweigh the benefits** and cooperation is **sought before conflict occurs**.

## Cartels

#### Check the news---batteries are booming

Matthew Farmer, writer for Power Technology, 4-1-2021, "Is this the golden age of battery innovation?," Power Technology, https://www.power-technology.com/features/is-this-the-golden-age-of-battery-innovation/)

Energy storage has taken off since the millennium. In 2000, the European Patent Office (EPO) had registered 1,029 unique invention patents filed at two or more offices worldwide, a measure known as international patent families (IPFs). In 2018, the number of IPFs had risen to 7,153, almost seven times more within two decades. Between 2005 and 2018, the number of battery-related patents grew faster than other types of patents, by an average of 14%, year after year. The EPO administers patents across most European countries, both in and out of the EU. In concert with the International Energy Agency (IEA), it looked at [innovation in batteries](http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/969395F58EB07213C12585E7002C7046/$FILE/battery_study_en.pdf) for consumer electronics, electric vehicles, and utility-scale energy storage. The number of international patent families related to applications for battery packs, 2000-18. Credit: European Patent Office A spokesperson for the EPO told us: “Although 91% of stationary energy storage is achieved by pumped hydropower nowadays , we expect a significant growth in innovation in stationary battery technologies. “Given that the requirements for stationary storage are set to become more diverse and more demanding as the share of variable renewable electricity rises, we expect innovation in batteries will need to rise further, in parallel with innovations in non-battery stationary electricity storage, especially for longer duration storage.” Innovations in any one of these can benefit all markets. As an example, patenting activity in the manufacturing and engineering of battery cells has grown to three times its size in the past decade. In 2018, half of all battery-related IPFs concerned manufacturing and engineering. The EPO/IEA report points to downward price trends as proof of synergy between different applications. It continues: “For example, the Tesla Roadster, the first highway legal serial production all-electric car to use lithium-ion battery cells, was launched in 2008. “In the following 10 years, improvements to battery packs catering for the wide range of all-electric cars and plug-in hybrid cars on the market have had positive spill-over effects on stationary applications, many of which can reuse modified vehicle batteries once they have reached the end of their useful lives within vehicles.” The overwhelming majority of battery patents have come from electric vehicle battery technology. Patents concerning batteries for electric vehicles overtook those for consumer electronics in 2011. Since then, growth has generally accelerated. Batteries for “stationary applications”, those designed for utility and domestic use, have risen much more slowly. What consumer and vehicular batteries can mean for utility operators Lithium-ion batteries in consumer electronics have become 90% cheaper since 1995 and electric vehicles have seen a similar fall since 2010. However, stationary batteries saw a smaller fall, of two-thirds, in the last decade. An EPO spokesperson tells us: “So far, the boom in batteries has been driven by lithium-ion [cells], which can indeed generate spill-overs for stationary applications (see for example Tesla powerwalls). However, Li-ion is not the only, and possibly not the best, technology option for stationary storage. “In particular, redox-flow batteries are an important technology in this context. It is important to keep in mind that the requirements for energy storage for vehicles are quite different from those for stationary applications. For vehicles, high-energy density is key, while stationary applications mainly require low costs and scalability. “In this sense, stationary battery innovation can benefit from innovation in the field of batteries for automotive because technology that becomes less attractive for electric vehicles can be deployed at a lower cost for stationary applications on the grid. Therefore, we expect that also in the future, battery innovation initially focused on mobility applications will then at a later stage be beneficial also for stationary applications.” “It seems likely that electric vehicle batteries will be used extensively for stationary storage” The supply chains developed for car battery production can also benefit stationary applications. As the report states: “In China, LFP batteries were used for the majority of grid-scale installations in 2019 because the Chinese Government had tightened energy density requirements for electric vehicle batteries. The resulting manufacturing overcapacity in this relatively lower-density technology was redirected towards grid-scale applications.” Battery management systems and sensors for reading energy levels have also benefitted from innovation in electric vehicles. As manufacturers of electric vehicles move toward integrated energy storage, preservation of batteries will become essential to energy management systems. Innovations in current, temperature, and load management seem likely to seep into utility battery storage. The report suggests that 86% of battery IPFs applying to stationary applications also apply to electric vehicles. While many of these may only have incidental applications for stationary storage, the rise of electric vehicles will doubtless lead to further innovations for utility-scale operators. The EPO continues: “It seems likely that electric vehicle batteries will be used extensively for stationary storage, either at the end of their life or simply because they will be manufactured at higher volumes. Knowledge [innovation] spill-overs, on the other hand, might arise from such innovations as reduced reliance on volatile critical mineral supply chains and durable chemistries for fast charge/discharge.” Annual demand for all batteries stood at 200GWh in 2019, with three-quarters of this going toward electric vehicles. By 2040, the IEA expects battery demand to increase to 10TWh, but with utility-scale electricity storage representing a much larger share of the market. Battery storage throughput capacity is predicted to rise from 6GW in 2019 to 55GW in 2040. As development spurs innovation, this suggests that the “golden age” of utility-scale battery storage could be yet to come. Will Japan always be the home of battery innovation? By some distance, Japanese companies stand out as world-leaders for battery development. Second place Korea creates just over half the number of IPFs that Japan creates. The top 10 companies creating the most battery-related IPFs includes seven Japanese companies, LG and Samsung from Korea, and Bosch from Germany. All the companies involved operate worldwide, with research and development teams in several countries. But the presence of Panasonic, Toyota, Hitachi, Sony, NEC, Nissan, and Toshiba makes Japan a hotspot for battery IPF invention. The top 25 applicants in battery technology, 2000-18. Credit: European Patent Office The EPO told us: “Battery deployments in these two countries [Japan and Korea] is strongly related to the energy policies adopted by the two countries. Nowadays, we recognise that while the Republic of Korea has a similar electric car market to Japan, it is a leader in stationary batteries for utility-scale power grid services and behind-the-meter applications in buildings. “Battery deployment in Korea has been supported by tariff designs that aimed to shift peak demand in the industrial and commercial sectors – charging during low-load hours and discharging during peak hours benefitted from price discounts and premiums compared with the prevailing retail prices. These policy measures reflect the mix of energy sources on the Korean grid and the specificities of reducing emissions in this country, which relies on fossil fuel imports for a significant share of energy needs.” Despite the number of Japanese car companies making these innovations, the country’s global share of electric cars remains low. Japan accounts for just 2% of global electric car sales, while China accounts for 50%. As such, growing Chinese companies may surge toward electric vehicle innovation in future, while Korea seems set to overtake Japan. Despite their economic might, companies from the US and China fall outside the top 10. Japan’s dominance only falters in the smaller field of mechanical energy storage, where European inventors hold the most patents followed by the US. European inventors also have a strong stake in thermal energy storage, where their share of patents is only slightly smaller than Japan’s. While Chinese companies lie outside the top 10, the country’s share of electric car sales is reflected in the country’s battery patenting, which mostly covers electric vehicle designs. Korea has a similarly advanced electric vehicle market, but its research has mostly advanced stationary power storage and behind-the-meter applications.

# 1NR

### Turn

#### colonization causes interplanetary war – extinction

Torres 18 (Phil Torres is the founder of the X-Risks Institute, an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies “Space colonization and suffering risks: Reassessing the “maxipok rule”” Futures Volume 100, June 2018, Pages 74-85) DAH

With this brief sketch of space weaponry in mind, let’s consider the deterrence predicament beginning with the colonization of Mars and expanding outward from there. As colonies on the fourth rock from the sun become increasingly Earth-independent, they will begin to develop their own culture, political systems, religious traditions, and perhaps even technologies. The Darwinian and Kurzweilian mechanisms will also engender new forms of martian posthumans that nontrivially differ from Earth-bound (post)humans. If “morphological freedom” is granted to martian citizens, then there could emerge a general phylogenetic trajectory of the entire population in addition to more specific ontogenetic trajectories resulting from individual phenotype modifications. (The same goes for populations on Earth.) As Deudney (in press) notes, geopolitical theory predicts that groups exhibiting greater differences are more likely to engage in conflict, and since differences are likely to evolve between the populations of Earth and Mars, one should expect tensions to rise. There could, for example, be competition for astronomical resources (such as asteroids and comets), leading to disagreements about inter-planetary policies and practices. Domestic affairs that one side sees as worrisome—e.g., the election of a demagogic strongman with xenophobic tendencies, or the collapse of some global regulatory organization—could also lead each to question the trustworthiness of the other, thus planting the seeds for a security dilemma whereby each militarizes space, for “defensive” reasons, in response to the other militarizing space, and so on. One might surmise here that a balance of terror could establish bipolar stability, just as MAD did during the Cold War. Yet this appears implausible given the weapons mentioned above. For example, if one side could release self-replicating nanobots that ~~cripple~~{Demolish} the target civilization before it can retaliate, the result would be a terror imbalance that, under certain circumstances, would make a first strike game theoretically rational. In fact, Kurzweil outlines a scenario in which ecophages destroy the entire biosphere of Earth within ∼90 min. This would involve a two-stage attack: first, a small population of nanobots would spread around the globe, and second, at an “optimal” time this population would begin to self-replicate at an exponential pace. To put this in perspective, signal delays between Earth and Mars range from 4 to 24 min, depending on where each planet is in its orbit, and travel times range from 150 to 300 days. Add to this the inevitable lag of bureaucracies and the outcome is a serious credibility-of-deterrence problem. Even more, some future genius could invent a far more effective way of weaponizing nanobots in the next 100 years, at which point humanity will probably have established martian colonies.19 Related scenarios involving designer pathogens that initiate “engineered global pandemics” or planetoid bombs capable of obliterating whole metropolises—or perhaps an entire ecumenopolis, if one exists—could also be imagined, although I will leave this task for the reader. But the situation is far worse than this, because ecophages, pathogens, and asteroids won’t pose the greatest risks to inter-planetary peace: heliobeams, DEWs, and gravity waves not only could inflict catastrophic damage on their targets but they could do this at or near lightspeed. In a flash, one civilization could ~~cripple~~ {obliterate}the other’s key military and/or civilian infrastructure, thus rendering it unable to effectively respond to an attack. Furthermore, since the speed of light imposes an upper bound on information transfer, there could be, in principle, no early-warning systems to alert the target civilization that an attack has commenced, which would severely compromise its ability to initiate defensive measures. One might here wonder: perhaps the attackee could overcome this defensive vulnerability by stationing counterstrike military drones throughout the solar system. They could be programmed to launch a coordinated attack if they fail to receive a “no-strike” signal that is ordinarily sent to them every few minutes. Thus, the destruction of key military infrastructure would result in the cessation of this signal and therefore the initiation of a counterstrike. But this too appears otiose since a first strike using, say, DEWs could simply target these drones as well. The result is that threats of retaliation from each civilization would be literally in-credible and the balance of terror would collapse. Here we should also not overlook the potential for accidents to cause conflicts when inter-civilizational tensions are sufficiently high. The disturbing historical fact is that “pure dumb luck” played a critical role in preventing nuclear war from occurring during the Cold War. Individuals like Vasili Arkhipov and Stanislav Petrov more or less single-handedly averted nuclear holocausts, and an interpretation error in 1995 led Boris Yeltsin to become “the first Russian president to ever have the ‘nuclear suitcase’ open in front of him” (Cirincione, 2013). Although intelligence is negatively correlated with accident proneness, and presumably our (post)human descendants will be cognitively enhanced to some extent, even a small probability of error could make disaster almost certain (see Torres, forthcoming). For example, imagine that a mere 500 people have access to a “button” that, if pushed, would initiate a catastrophic first strike against the other civilization. If each of these individuals has a mere 0.01 chance per decade of accidentally pushing this button, the result is a staggering 99.3 percent probability that, within 10 years, the strike will occur. So, perhaps Earth and Mars—whose civilizations could potentially coexist for another 10 million centuries, until the sun burns out—won’t be quite as lucky as the US and Soviet Union were for the slightly more than four decades between 1947 and 1991. The final step in the present argument is to project this bi-planetary predicament into the vast reaches of outer space. Consider the billions and billions and billions of populations that could come to occupy a universe with 10 trillion galaxies and 1024 stars, each with its own traditions, boasting of weapons that could destroy entire galaxies or even the entire universe, and embedded in a cosmopolitical system of lawless anarchy. There is no supreme governing system to provide security and no policies of deterrence to reliably prevent first strikes. It is hard to imagine how such a predicament could avoid constant and catastrophic wars between civilizations both near and far. Indeed, theorists like Waltz (1979) have argued that multipolar state configurations are less stable and more prone to conflict than bipolar configurations. The reason is that uncertainty increases with the number of actors, and as uncertainty increases, so does distrust of everyone else’s intentions. Hence, the more civilizations there are in the universe, the greater the incentive for Tuckerian actors to preventively or preemptively strike their neighbors—or to induce a vacuum bubble in the hope that an “assembler” on the “other side” can enable some form of post-transition survival. The point is that the future will be marked by radical multipolarity, and this will greatly increase the probability of violence. Yet the difficulty of establishing Earth-independent colonies on Mars without catastrophic wars—as outlined above—suggests that our descendants might not make it beyond the solar system. In fact, Deudney (in press) argues that attempts to colonize space could constitute the Great Filter that explains why we see no evidence of intelligent aliens crying out for cosmic companionship in a universe slowly sinking into thermodynamic equilibrium.20

#### Decline causes transition – changes entrenched models of growth and empowers calls for degrowth

Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” *Ecology and Society*, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of more radical systemic change.The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review.The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?The economic crisis has an empirical basis in factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’ outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated. The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena. Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying responses.This economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although the economy now seems on a path to recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist.From a countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more apparent the need for structural change. This becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see O’Riordan 2013).Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces, and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth 2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and “the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled, changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change.We use here narratives of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social (counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy.Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).

#### Your models are wrong – trade doesn’t solve war

Miller 14 – Charles Miller, Lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” April 2014) <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/>

John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, their model failed to take three things into account. First, it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown (here and here) that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in East Asia impossible. ‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.

#### Doesn’t say growth causes war – says that there are many internal factors that determine security dilemma – market stability is one

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin's Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states' alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states' interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states' behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other's regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### Decline is inevitable – peak oil

Also read Green = at: voluntary demand decline/market adjusts

Rutherford 17 – Jonathan Rutherford, coordinator of the new international bookshop, Melbourne Australia, 2017 ("What’s really driving the global economic crisis is net energy decline," *Medium*, August 2nd, <https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/whats-really-driving-the-global-economic-crisis-is-net-energy-decline-82efb9ca45fe?utm_content=buffer4e424&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer>, AIvackovic)

Energy and GDP Growth Axiom 1: As the biophysical economists have shown global economic growth is closely correlated with growth in energy consumption. Professor Minqi Li of Utah University’s Department of Economics, for example, shows that between 2005 and 2016: ‘an increase in economic growth rate by one percentage point is associated with an increase in primary energy consumption by 0.96 percent.’ GDP growth also depends on improvements in energy efficiency — Li reports that over the last decade energy efficiency improved by an average of 1.7% per annum. One of the future uncertainties is how rapidly we are likely to improve energy efficiency — future supply constraints are likely to incentivise this strongly, and there will be scope for significant efficiency improvements, but there is also to be diminishing returns once the low hanging fruit has been picked. Axiom 2: Economic growth depends not just on increases in gross energy consumption and energy efficiency, but the availability of net energy. Net energy can be defined as the energy left over after subtracting the energy used to attain energy — i.e. the energy used during the process of extraction, harvesting and transportation of energy. Net energy is critical because it alone powers the non-energy sectors of the global economy. Without net energy all non-energy related economic activity would cease to function. Insight: An important implication is that net energy can be in decline, even while gross primary energy supply is constant or even increasing. Below I will make my case for a probably intensifying global net energy contraction by discussing, first, broad factors shaping the probable trajectory of global primary energy growth, followed by a discussion of overall net energy. Most of the statistics are drawn from Minqi Li’s latest report which, in turn, draws on the latest BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Prospects for Gross Energy Consumption Over the last decade, world primary energy consumption grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent. It’s important to note, however, as Jean- Jancovici shows, that in per-capita terms the rate of energy growth has significantly slowed since the 1980s, increasing at an average annual rate of 0.4% since that time, compared to 1.2% in the century prior. This is mainly due to the slowing growth in world oil supply, since the two oil shocks in the 1970s. There are strong reasons for thinking that the rate of increase in gross energy availability will slow further in coming decades. Recently a peer reviewed paper estimated the maximum rate at which humanity could exploit all ultimately recoverable fossil fuel resources. It found that depending on assumptions, the peak in all fossil fuels would be reached somewhere between 2025–2050 (a finding that aligns with several other studies see i.e Maggio and Cacciola 2012; Laherrere, 2015). This is highly significant because today fossil fuels make up about 86% of global primary energy use — a figure that, notwithstanding all global efforts to date, has barely changed in three decades. This surprising early peak estimate is substantially associated with the recent radical down-scaling of estimated economically and technically recoverable coal reserves. The situation for oil is particularly critical, especially given that it is by far the world’s major source of liquid fuel, powering 95% of all transport. A recent HSBC report found that, already today, somewhere between 60–80% of conventional oil fields are in terminal decline. It estimated that by 2040 the world would need to find four Saudi Arabia’s (the largest oil supplier) worth of additional oil just to maintain current rates of supply and more than double that to meet 2040 projected demand. And yet, as the same report showed, new oil discoveries have been in long term decline — lately reaching record lows notwithstanding record investments between 2001–2014. Moreover, new discoveries are invariably smaller fields with more rapid peak and decline rates. The recent boom in US tight oil — a bubble fueled by low interest rates and record oil industry debts — has been responsible for most additional supply since the peak in conventional oil in 2005, but is likely to be in terminal decline within the next 5–10 years, if it has not already peaked. All this, as Nafeez Ahmed has argued, is generating the conditions within the next few years (once the current oil glut has been drawn down) for an oil supply crunch and price spike that has the potential to send the debt-ridden global economy into a bigger and better global financial crisis tailspin. It may well be a seminal event that future historians look back as marking the beginning of the end for the oil age. An alternative currently fashionable view is that peak oil will be effectively trumped by a near-term voluntary decline in oil demand (so called ‘peak demand’), mainly due to the predicted rise of electric vehicles. One reason (among several), however, to be skeptical of such forecasts is that currently there is absolutely no evidence that oil demand is in decline — on the contrary, it continues to increase every year, and since the oil price drop in 2014, at an accelerating rate. When peak oil does arrive, there are likely to be powerful incentives to implement coal-to-liquids or gas-to-liquids but, apart from the huge logistical and infrastructure problems involved, a move in this direction will only accelerate the near-term peaking of coal and gas supply, especially given the energetic inefficiencies involved in fuel conversion. Peak oil will also likely incentivise the acceleration towards electrification of transport and renewable energy, to which I will now turn.

# 2NR

#### Extinction isn’t inevitable unless we attempt to colonize

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Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere and its life sustaining habitat due environmental catastrophes such as climate change, ocean acidification, disruption of the food chain, bio-warfare, nuclear war, nuclear winter, and myriads of other man-made doomsday prophesies. **If we accept these** threats **as inevitabilities** on par with real astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual, political and technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, will **we play**ing **into a self- fulfilling prophesy of** our own **planetary doom**? Seeking space based solutions to our Earthly problems may in deed exacerbate the planetary threats we face. This is the core of the ethical dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put our recourses and bets on developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural and man-made catastrophes or should we focus all of our energies on solving the problems that create these threats on Earth? Human Life on The Moon and Mars What do the prospects of colonies or bases on the Moon and Mars offer? Both the Moon and Mars host extreme environments that are uninhabitable to humans without very sophisticated technological life supporting systems beyond any that are feasible now or will be available in the near future. Both bodies are subjected to deadly levels of solar radiation and are void of atmospheres that could sustain oxygen-based life forms such as humans. Terra- forming either body is not feasible with current technologies or within any reasonable time frames so any colony or base would be restricted to living in space capsules or trailer park like structures which could not support a sufficient number of humans to perpetuate and sustain the species in any long term manner. Although evidence of water has been discovered on both bodies, it exists in a form that is trapped in minerals, which would require huge amounts of energy to access. Water can be converted into fuel either as hydrogen or oxygen, which would eliminate the need to transport vast amounts of fuel from Earth. However, according to Britain's leading spaceflight expert, Professor Colin Pillinger, "You would need to heat up a lot of lunar soil to 200C to get yourself a glass of water." The promise of helium as an energy source on the moon to is mostly hype. Helium-3 could be used in the production of nuclear fusion energy, a process we have yet to prove viable or efficient on Earth. Mining helium would require digging dozens of meters into the lunar surface and processing hundreds of thousands of tons of soil to produce 1 ton of helium-3. (25 tons of helium-3 is required to power the US for 1 year.) Fusion also requires the very rare element tritium, which does not exist naturally on the Moon, Mars or on Earth in abundances needed to facilitate nuclear fusion energy production. There are no current means for generating the energy on the Moon to extract the helium-3 to produce the promised endless source of energy from helium-3 on the Moon. Similar energy problems exist for using solar power on the Moon, which has the additional problem of being sunlit two weeks a month and dark for the other two weeks. A Moon base is envisioned as serving as a launch pad for Martian expeditions, so the infeasibility of a lunar base may prohibit trips to Mars, unless they are launched directly from Earth. Mars is, in its closest approach, 36 million miles from Earth and would require a nine-month journey with astronauts exposed to deadly solar cosmic rays. Providing sufficient shielding would require a spacecraft that weighs so much it becomes prohibitive to carry enough fuel for a roundtrip. Either the astronauts get exposed to lethal doses on a roundtrip, or they make a safe one-way journey and never return. Either way, no one can survive a trip to Mars and whether or not people are willing to make that sacrifice for the sake of scientific exploration, human missions to Mars do not guarantee the survival of the species, but rather, only the death of any member who attempts the journey.Space Law and Space Ethics The technological hurdles prohibiting practical space colonization of the Moon and Mars in the near future are stratospherically high. The environmental and political consequences of pursuing these lofty dreams are even higher. There are no international laws governing the Moon or the protection of the space environment. The Moon Treaty, created in 1979 by the United Nations, declares that the Moon shall be developed to benefit all nations and that no military bases could be placed on the moon or on any celestial body, and bans altering the environment of celestial bodies. To date, no space faring nation has ratified this treaty, meaning, the moon, and all celestial bodies, including Mars and asteroids are up for the taking. If a nation did place a military base on the moon, they could potentially control all launches from Earth. The Moon is the ultimate military high ground. How should we, as a species, control the exploration, exploitation and control of the Moon and other celestial bodies if we can not even agree on a legal regime to protect and share its resources? Since the space race began 50 years ago with the launch of Sputnik, the space environment around Earth has become overcrowded with satellites and space debris, so much so, that circumterrestrial space has become a dangerous place with an increasing risk of collision and destruction. Thousands of pieces of space junk created from launches orbit the Earth in the same orbit as satellites, putting them at risk of collision. Every time a rocket is launched, debris from the rocket stages are put into orbital space. In 2009 there was a disastrous collision between an Iridium satellite and a piece of space junk that destroyed the satellite. In 2007 China blew up one of its defunct satellites to demonstrate its antiballistic missile capabilities, increasing the debris field by 15%. There are no international laws prohibiting anti-satellite actions. Every year, since the mid 1980s, a treaty has been introduced into the UN for a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), with all parties including Russia and China voting for it except for the US. How can we hope to pursue a peaceful and environmentally sound route of space exploration without international laws in place that protect space and Earth environments and guarantee that the space race to the moon and beyond does not foster a war over space resources? Indeed, if the space debris problem continues to grow unfettered or if there is war in space, space will become too trashed for launches to take place without risk of destruction. The private development of space is growing at a flurried rate. Competitions such as the X-Prize for companies to reach orbit and the Google Prize to land a robot on the Moon has launched space wanderlust in citizens throughout the country who dream of traveling to space. The reality is that there are few protections for the environment and the passengers of these flights of fancy. The FAA, which regulates space launches, is under a Congressional mandate to foster the industry. It is difficult if not impossible to have objective regulation of an industry when it enjoys government incentives to profit. We have much to determine on planet Earth before we launch willy nilly into another race into space and a potential environmental disaster and arms race in outer space. Spaceship Earth If we direct our intellectual and technological resources toward space exploration without consideration of the environmental and political consequences, what is left behind in the wake? The hype surrounding space exploration leaves a dangerous vacuum in the collective consciousness of solving the problems on Earth. If we accept the inevitability of Earth’s destruction and its biosphere, we are left looking toward the heavens for our solutions and resolution. Young scientists, rather than working on serious environmental challenges on Earth, dream of Moon or Martian bases to save humanity, fueling the prophesy of our planetary destruction, rather than working on solutions to solve the problems on Earth. Every space faring entity, be they governmental or corporate, face the same challenges. Star Trek emboldened us all to dream of space, the final frontier. The reality is that our planet Earth is a perfect spaceship. We travel around our star the sun once every year, and the sun pull us with her gravitational force around the galaxy once every 250 million years through star systems, star clusters and all the possible exosolar planets that may host life or be habitable for us to colonize. The sun will be around for billions of years and we have ample time to explore the stars. It would be wise and prudent for us as a species to focus our intellectual and technological knowledge now into preserving our spaceship for the long voyage through the stars, so that once we have figured out how to make life on Earth work in an environmentally and politically sustainable way, we can then venture off the planet into the final frontier of our dreams.